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The U.S. biofuel industry is striving to produce 
ethanol from cellulosic feedstock sources in an 
effort to augment its existing corn grain-based 
ethanol production infrastructure.  Technology to 
commercially produce cellulosic ethanol is rapidly 
advancing due in large part to the availability of 
substancial federal research and development 
funding.  The most recent round grant funding 
awarded 10 grants totaling more than $10 million 
to accelerate fundamental research in the 
development of cellulosic biofuels. (USDA, 2008).  
At the moment, several firms have pilot scale 
cellulosic ethanol production facilities under 
construction and testing. 
 
The transition from pilot scale to full 
commercialization of cellulosic ethanol will be 
difficult, due in large part financial constraints 
being imposed both internally and externally on 
the biofuels industry.  This paper provides an 
overview of the biofuel industry’s current 
financial setting and describes future challenges it 
faces in attempting to expand.  These challenges 
are rooted in lack of industry capital, limited 
availability of performance benchmarks, concerns 
regarding future prospects of the industry, and 
general uncertainty in U.S. financial markets.  If 
the U.S. biofuels industry is unable to capitalize 
and develop this next phase of growth, foreign 
competitors, primarily Brazil and Mexico, appear 
well positioned to fill U.S. consumer’s demand 




In 2005, the U.S. established ambitious goals for 
production of ethanol and other biofuels with 
passage of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) as 
part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (H.R.2)
1.   
This legislation set a national goal of increasing 
the volume of renewable fuel required to be 
blended into gasoline of 7.5 billion gallons by 
2012.  To achieve this goal, a number of tax 
credits including $0.51/gal. of ethanol blended, a 
$0.54 tariff on imported ethanol and other 
incentives stimulating both ethanol supply and 
demand were provided.  Many states also 
provided incentives and mandates to complement 
the new federal legislation. 
 
Following passage of this legislation, investment 
in new corn grain ethanol facilities skyrocketed.  
Production capacity in 2005 totaled 3.9 bil. gal. 
(Renewable Fuel Association). In 2008, 
production is expected to exceed 9 bil. gal, 
surpassing the original RFS goal nearly four 
years early.   
 
In addition to favorable federal legislation, 
several positive economic factors contributed to 
rapid growth of the corn grain ethanol industry.  
First, national corn prices averaged $2.00/bu. 
(USDA/NASS, 2008), relatively low compared to 
both historical and current levels.  Moreover, oil 
prices were continuing to increase due to rising 
domestic and foreign demand coupled with 
stagnating increases in supply (Hamilton, J., 
2008).  Consequently, ethanol plant profit 
margins were very positive enabling many plants 
to repay their debt financing ahead of schedule 
and profit from larger than expected returns to 
equity investors.  The strong financial 
performance of the industry caught the attention 
of Wall Street investors.  In Oct. 2007, the Wall 
Street Journal reported that over $3 billion has 
flowed from Wall Street investors to rural 
                                                 
1 For brevity, the rest of this paper will focus on ethanol.  
Comments made generally apply to other biofuels as well. America. This inflow of funds created new 
economic activity in rural areas of the economy 
that were previously quite stressed. 
 
 The final important economic factor leading to 
rapid expansion of the industry was ready access 
to current technology as well as the availability of 
production standards.  When investors were 
evaluating potential construction of a new corn 
grain ethanol production facility, they could be 
assured that the plant would produce at the name 
plate capacity.  In additional, the supply chain 
and risk management support provided as part of 
the comprehensive investment package yielded 
attractive, but more importantly, stable returns.  
Consequently, replication of ethanol plant 
facilities rapidly advanced across the country, 
further heightening investor expectations. 
 
In addition to investors, rural communities 
benefited from both the economic activity 
associated with construction as well as on-going 
revenue enhancement from operations.  
Urbanchuk (2008) estimated a direct increase of 
$1.3 billion in state and local tax revenues 
attributable to the biofuel industry.  These 
additional revenues have been invaluable to cash-
strapped rural communities who face both  
 
population declines as well increasing federal and 
state mandates. 
 
While many original ethanol producing facilities 
were organized and financed by local investors 
and cooperatives, the growth of external finance 
has changed the local economic impact of these 
firms. Swenson and Eathington (2008) find that 
for each one percent reduction in ethanol plant 
ownership, one less job is created in a local 
community.  Rather than patronize local firms 
and hire people from the surrounding region, 
externally owned plants purchase items from 
national suppliers and bring in people with 
experience working on previous projects. 
 
Current Financial Situation 
 
Figure 1 shows historical ethanol plant margins 
compiled by ProExporter.  Ethanol plant margin 
is defined  as residual returns after all costs are 
subtracted from available revenues.  The data 
illustrate the growth of investment returns from 
2002 to mid-2006.  At peak profitability 
investment returns spiked to over $2.25 per 
gallon.  At the time, plant investment costs 
hovered around $1.00 per gallon.  Consequently, 
investors at the time could rapidly recover their 
original investment and earn substantial returns. 
 
 
        Fig. 1 Ethanol Plant MarginsSince mid-2006 though, ethanol plant margins 
have steadily deteriorated.  Ethanol prices have 
declined as the increasing number of plants 
entering the industry have expanded supply.  
Larger supplies of ethanol have pressured ethanol 
prices because demand has not risen 
commensurately.  Likewise, the greater number 
of plants have bid up corn feedstock costs which 
in turn has raised costs of production and lowered 
profitability.  The effects of both changes have 
resulted in ethanol plant margins being driven to 
near zero.  When plant margins approach zero in 
any industry, the point is reached where existing 
firms continue to operate at breakeven levels, but 
new firms are not encouraged to enter.  
Consequently, external financial capital now has 
limited interest in the industry. 
 
Share prices of publically traded ethanol firms 
have declined in tandem with falling margins.  
Fig. 2 illustrates the negative trend in Verasun 
Energy Corporation’s stock price.  Verasun’s 
current stock price is approximately one-tenth of 
its peak value.  This decline in firm value makes 
attraction of additional capital and expansion 
difficult.  However, declining share prices have 
minimal impact on firm operations – more 
important are operating margins. 
 
One must remember that existing firms in the 
industry have differing financial characteristics 
and profitability as they were constructed at 
different times, face varying input and product 
price opportunities and have made diverse 
strategic and risk management decisions.   
Therefore, at any one time some firms are likely  
to be quite profitable, even in less than favorable 
economic climates while others will struggle in 
the best of times.  Figure 3 shows that some firms 
will be idle even at high profit margins (Wilson, 
2008).  At presently low margins, capacity 
utilization declines to only 62 percent.  Again, 
new firms have minimal incentive to enter 
industry. 
 
In addition to margin pressures, several other 
industry forces are discouraging further 
investment in new corn grain ethanol facilities.  
First, construction costs for erecting a new plant 
have doubled since passage of the original RFS.  
Current construction costs exceed $2 per gallon 
of capacity (DeVos, 2007).  Second, tax credits 
underpinning growth of the industry are not 
certain.  Most were scheduled to expire at the end 
of 2010.  However, recently passed Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) extends 
these tax provisions 1-2 years.  Although helpful, 
this extension is of minimal value to prospective 
investors because they desire great certainty and 
assurances that tax benefits will continue over the 
lifespan of their project.  Third, the general public 
has raised new concerns regarding environmental 
impacts and resource demands, especially water, 
associated with ethanol plant operations, and 
competition with available food supplies.  Fourth, 
DeVos (2007) carefully describes limitations of 
existing credit programs designed to facilitate 
industry expansion.  As individual ethanol plants 
increase in physical size and capacity, size 
restrictions placed in legislative provisions 
 
Fig. 3 Ethanol Plant Margin vs. Capacity Utilization 
constrain their usefulness to 
plant operators and investors.  
Finally, one of the most 
important factors is the rapid 
availability of new ethanol plant 
technology following large 
federal investments in research 
and development.  Essentially, 
new construction of corn grain 
ethanol plants has stalled as 
investors wait for the availability 
of next generation cellulosic 
ethanol plants. 
y = 0.2014x + 0.6246
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margin))In a commodity market, which both ethanol and 
corn are, firms must be low cost producers in 
order to compete.  Consequently, they most 
quickly adopt innovations which either increase 
revenues or lower costs.  In addition to potential 
adoption of new cellulosic feedstock technology, 
the industry is striving to adopt new fractionation 
and gasification technology.  Fractionation is a 
process whereby incoming feedstock is separated 
into component parts prior to entering 
fermenation.  As a result, the enriched input 
provides a higher conversion rate which expands 
plant capacity (e.g. less waste material needs to 
be handled).  In addition, Gustafson, et al. (2008) 
find that fractionation can also quicken 
fermentation which improves throughput, again 
increasing capacity.  Gustafson, et al.  also find 
that the value of co-products increases with 
fractionation.  Since not all starch is fermented, 
the higher quality input results in higher quality 
co-products.  Finally, the other fraction, which is 
typically a higher protein or oil based product 
provides a new additional revenue stream.  
Gasification enables an ethanol plant to either 
gasify a waste product or lower cost feedstock for 
plant heat. 
 
While investor interest in new projects is at a 
temporary lull, the overall health of the industry 
remains positive.  AgCountry, a regional Farm 
Credit System lender, has financed 44 ethanol 
plants or one-fourth of the country’s industry 
through direct loans, participations, and 
securitization.  As of Sept. 2008, only 3 plants 
were under “watch” due to poor financial health, 
and only one plant was “a concern” (DeVos, 
2008).  However, the last plant’s situation is not 
dire, and AgCountry does not expect to lose any 
portion of credit that they have extended to the 
firm. 
 
Collapse of International Credit Markets 
 
The most recent development impacting financial 
health of the ethanol industry is the collapse of 
international credit markets.  Given slim industry 
margins and other factors prevailing in the corn 
grain ethanol industry’s notably cool investment 
climate, financing for either new ethanol plants or 
major expansion projects was virtually 
nonexistant prior to the collapse.  Therefore, the 
actual collapse of international financial markets 
has had a minimal effect on industry expansion.   
 
Likewise, existing biofuel plants have only been 
“bruised” by the collapse given the large impact 
seasonality has on the industry.  Due to the 
seasonality of feedstock supply most 
agribusinesses negotiate their credit arrangements 
prior to the harvest season when input supply 
purchases begin.  They start by forecasting peak 














































In this example, the firm’s 
fiscal year begins Sept. 1
st.  
With some produce left to 
sell from the previous 
fiscal year, they start with 
a small surplus.  However, 
when feedstock purchases 
begin in mid- October, 
their seasonal credit needs 
escalate to a point in April 
when a maximum of $280 
million is required.  To 
finance this need, the firm 
obtains either a letter of 
credit or revolving loan 
from a lender.  Given the magnitude of the credit request, the lender will 
partner with other creditors and develop either a 
participation or securitization instrument
2. Larger 
agribusinesses, typically pay a fee to obtain this 
line of credit, but usually do not expect to draw 
upon available funds.  In essence annual letters of 
credit serve as a safety net and signify 
creditworthiness that permit large agribusiness to 
borrow less expensive credit in commercial paper 
markets.   Credit obtained through commercial 
paper is lower cost, otherwise firms would simply 
draw on existing letters of credit.  When national 
credit and commercial paper markets dried up in 
fall 2008, large ethanol plants had backup sources 
of credit (their existing formal letters of credit), 
albeit at higher cost.  Therefore, when 
commercial paper financing was unavailable, 
plant operations could continue and firms drew 
upon letters of credit, lowering firm profitability.  
Smaller firms precluded from commercial paper 
markets due to size, were already drawing upon 
existing lines of credit.  Firms most impacted by 
the collapse were those that delayed negotiating 
letters of credit.  They did so in an attempt to lock 
in lower rates in an environment of declining 
interest rates due to favorable monetary policy 
and lower credit demand.  However, they found 
their situation problematic as lenders had 
difficulty forging participation and securitization 
agreements. 
 
The EEAS provides the biofuel industry with a 
number of beneficial tax provisions.  Many 
existing biofuel tax provisions are extended for 
another 1-2 years, as mentioned above.  An 
important new addition is that cellulosic biofuel 
plants are now eligible for a 50 percent tax credit.  
The cellulosic biofuel industry is on the verge of 
becoming commercially viable in the next couple 
of years. Rising construction costs are an 
important constraint to commercialization. Due to 
their complexity and additional equipment 
requirements, cellulosic biofuel plants are nearly 
twice as expensive as corn ethanol plants ($4 
compared with $2 per gallon of capacity), Devos 
(2007). The new cellulosic tax provision reduces 
                                                 
2 In a participation, the lead lender has primary contact with 
creditor who services the loan.  Under securitization, all 
lenders have direct contact and service responsibility, 
although shares and involvment may not be equal. 
construction costs of a new cellulosic plant, 
placing it nearly on par with existing corn grain 
ethanol plants.  Several pilot scale facilities are 
operational, and construction of commercial scale 
plants are expected in the near future if test runs 
are positive. 
 
The 2008 EESA also provides an important 
glimpse into growth of the U.S. carbon market. 
U.S. citizens are becoming more concerned about 
global warming, climate change, greenhouse gas 
emissions and carbon.  Therefore, it is central to 
the development of recent biofuels legislation. In 
addition, California, Florida and Massachusetts 
have passed state legislation lowering the carbon 
intensity of their liquid transportation fuels. It is 
quite likely that biofuels created with low carbon 
release processes will command a premium in the 
market place. 
 
However, the economic value of carbon has been 
difficult to determine.The trading of carbon on 
the Chicago Climate Exchange has been 
somewhat thin. The federal government continues 
to discuss how national carbon values will be 
determined and controlled. One scheme being 
widely debated is “cap and trade.” 
 
In the 2008 EESA, the legislation provides a 
$10 credit per ton for the first 75 million 
metric tons of carbon dioxide captured and 
transported from an industrial source for use in 
enhanced oil recovery and $20 credit per ton for 
carbon dioxide captured and transported from 
an industrial source for permanent storage in a 
geologic formation. Budget staff expects that 
more than $1.1 billion will be spent in the next 
decade. With publication of these values in the 
legislation, we now have a guidepost for 
establishing carbon values in the future. The 
biofuels industry will have an important 
benchmark for valuing carbon when new 
investment budgets are constructed.  Inclusion of 
carbon credits in financial budgets will directly 
enhance both ethanol plant profitability and 
investment prospects. 
 
Financing Next Generation Biofuel Plants 
 
While financial growth of the corn grain biofuel 
industry has been relatively straightforward to document and track, defining financial prospects 
for the biofuels next stage of growth, primarily 
into cellulosic and other advanced biofuels 
outlined in EISA, is not as transparent.  Several 
key uncertainties at the firm financial, industry, 
and capital market level cloud the investment 
horizon. 
 
Issue 1 - Lack of Capital 
 
Only a handful of lenders across the country have 
actively provided credit to the biofuels industry.  
Most notable is First National Bank of Omaha.  
The portfolios of these lenders are saturated 
(DeVos, 2008).  New suppliers of credit will be 
required to foster additional growth of the 
industry. 
 
Likewise, existing ethanol firms have limited 
credit reserves.  Most ethanol credit arrangements 
have covenants which dictate terms of credit 
advancement and other loan performance 
behavior.  Most onerous of these is the imposition 
of “sweeps”.  Sweeps were imposed during the 
industry’s boom period.  They are designed to 
accelerate repayment of principal and interest 
during periods of high profitability.  In essence, 
both lenders and equity holders share in the 
prosperity and overall lending risks are reduced.  
However, imposition of sweeps constrains equity 
future growth as firms never get the chance to 
build equity reserves.  Now when the industry is 
experiencing marginal profitability but requires 
significant capital to adopt new technology, firms 
have only modest equity to form a new borrowing 
base.  This is especially problematic with new 
technology is four times as expensive as previous 
investment costs, although passage of EESA tax 
credits is helpful (DeVos, 2007). 
 
Issue 2 - Industry Uncertainty 
 
Biofuel plants of the future will likely utilize a 
wide variety of feedstocks and conversion 
technologies, given the breadth of current 
research projects under study.  As a result, there 
is likely to be wide variation in plant size and 
performance.  Investors are going to have 
difficulty evaluating new proposals if industry 
performance benchmarks are unavailable.  Recall 
growth of the industry to this point was fostered 
by widely available performance standards that 
enabled replication of corn ethanol plants across 
the countryside. 
 
While federal tax credits have been extended for 
1-2 years, uncertainty still surrounds their long 
term availability – especially in our country’s 
present financial predicament.  Passage of long-
term provisions would alleviate investor 
concerns.   
 
In addition, implementation of 2007 EISA, 
especially definition of the process for trading of 
RINs, is still under development (Meyer, 2008).  
Specification of the RIN trading process is 
required to establish and value low carbon fuels.  
Premiums commanded by these fuels will be a 
key determinant of future cellulosic plant 
profitability.  As mentioned earlier, market values 
of carbon are not readily transparent and tradable.  
Consequently, investors are reluctant to advance 
equity funds until these values can be capitalized. 
 
Finally, a gap exists between producer costs for 
biomass collection and a cellulosic plant’s ability 
to pay for feedstock supplied – without any 
consideration of transportation cost.  Bangsund, 
et al. (2008), and Epplin (2008).  While $30-40/t 
cost is usually budgeted as a feedstock cost in an 
cellulosic ethanol feasibility study, producer 
supply costs are typically double that value. 
 
Issue 3 - Wall Street Turmoil 
 
As this is being written, the extent of fallout from 
the collapse of Wall Street financial markets is 
unknown.  Given what has already occurred, 
coupled with passage of the $700 billion package 
of assistance in EESA, our nation’s economy and 
credit markets will be affected for some time.  At 
the recent meeting of NC1014: Agricultural and 
Rural Finance Markets in Transition, Thomas 
Hoening, president, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City indicated that economic performance 
of our country maybe subdued for the next 
decade.  When financial market crisis have 
recently afflicted other countries, namely Japan 
and Sweden, it took nearly a decade to restore 
investor wealth to pre-existing levels.  
Throughout the recovery period, investors were 
hesitant and capital availability was constrained While the length of recovery can be debated, 
slower economic performance translates into 
lower demand for products.  Now that the U.S. 
financial crisis has affected other countries 
spanning the globe, worldwide demand for oil is 
likely to decline.  After closing NYMEX futures 
closed at $77.70/barrel on Friday, Oct. 10, 2008 
prices for light sweet Texas crude oil are nearly 
one-half of their high last July.  Consequently, 
prices of other liquid petroleum products have 
dropped as well, lowering future profitability of 
all biofuel plants. 
 
Finally, given worldwide turmoil in financial 
markets, investors are driving up the exchange 
value of the U.S. dollar in a “flight to quality”.  
Given that the U.S. was the original source of the 
turmoil and real investor returns have been 
lowered following expansionary monetary policy, 
a decline in the dollar’s exchange rate would have 
been expected.  However, given that financial 
market problems are of similar concern 
worldwide, investors have sought out U.S. 
securities and view them as most stable.  
 
With a rising exchange value of the U.S. dollar, 
exports become less affordable overseas.  Since a 
large proportion of agricultural commodities are 
exported, and are now in less demand, 
commodity prices have softened.  Therefore, 
ethanol plants are striving to devise risk 
management plans in an environment when both 
input and output prices are rapidly declining. 
Increasing attention to margin protection will 
likely result.  Nevertheless, investors will need 
assurance that newly devised margin risk 
management schemes will protect biofuel plant 
profitability and repayment capacity in whatever 
economic climate eventually unfolds. 
 
If the investment pace in next generation biofuel 
plants slows, it appears that South American and 
Mexican firms are ready to fill the supply void in 
meeting 2007 EESA projections.  Recently 
announced intentions include: 
 
-  ApexBrasil/Unica, $10 million promotion 
campaign 
-  Grupo Santos, $12 billion, 60 sugarcane 
plants 
-  BP, $60 million sugar to ethanol plant, 
Gaois, Brazil 
-  Bunge and Itochu ink Sugar-Ethanol JV in 
Brazil 
 
Construction of these facilities would rapidly 
assist the U.S. in meeting its goal of producing 36 




The corn grain ethanol industry experienced rapid 
growth from 2005-07.  U.S. financial markets 
obliged and supplied credit at reasonable cost and 
terms which facilitated this expansion. Now, the 
biofuel industry is being asked to nearly triple 
production under recently passed federal 
legislation, 2007 EESA.   
 
However, the status of U.S. financial markets is 
in question.  Both existing first generation and 
prospective next generation biofuel plants are 
demanding a large influx of capital to support 
adoption of new technological innovations.  First 
generation plants require the innovations to 
remain low cost producers in highly competitive 
commodity markets.  Second generation plants 
seek innovations to commercialize the production 
of cellulosic and advanced biofuels.  In either 
case, the ability of financial markets to supply 
needed credit is unclear due to impediments that 
have reduced the borrowing capacity of biofuel 
firms; uncertainty surrounding future industry 
performance benchmarks, tax provisions, and 
implementation of current biofuel legislation; and 
the need for new risk management strategies 
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